

What Drives Citizen's Willingness to Protest? Evidence from Latin America

*¿Qué motiva la disposición a protestar?
Evidencia de América Latina*

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Abstract:

In Latin America, citizens view social protest as a means to influence public affairs and demand government response from a position of political disadvantage. The analysis reveals that people who belong to a discriminated social group are more willing to engage in protests. Likewise, voters who identified with the political opposition are more inclined to mobilise than the incumbent's supporters. Moreover, the findings show that citizens who simultaneously identify with a socially-discriminated group and support the opposition parties are particularly predisposed to take to the streets to advance their collective demands.



Resumen:

Este artículo argumenta que la ciudadanía latinoamericana considera a la protesta social como un mecanismo de influencia política desde posiciones de desventaja. El análisis muestra que la disposición a protestar es mayor cuando se pertenece a un grupo social que es objeto de algún tipo de discriminación. Asimismo, los votantes que se identifican con los partidos de oposición están más dispuestos a movilizarse que los apoyan al Gobierno en turno. Sin embargo, la disposición a participar en protestas es especialmente notoria entre personas que se sienten parte de grupo discriminado y se identifican, a la vez, con la oposición partidista.



Key Words:

Protest, grievances, discrimination, elections, public opinion.



Palabras clave:

Protestas, agravios, discriminación, elecciones, opinión pública.

What Drives Citizen's Willingness to Protest? Evidence from Latin America¹

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Social protest is a resource for exerting political influence when formal mechanisms of representation are deficient and governments lack the will or capacity to respond to collective demands. In Latin America, the increase in protests is associated with the institutional deficiencies of the region's democracies and the inability of governments to respond to the expectations of increasingly informed and participatory electorates.² Likewise, the wave of collective mobilisations in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador in 2019, the year of the 'social uprising', is seen as a consequence of citizen dissatisfaction with the institutional order in these countries, in the face of neoliberal policies, persistent inequalities and the 'unfulfilled promises' of democratisation.³ Although the COVID-19 pandemic temporarily curbed the mobilisations, new protests soon erupted with force in other countries across the region.

¹ This study is the result of a research stay at the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales (IIS) of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). The author is grateful to Miguel Armando López Leyva, researcher at IIS-UNAM for his academic hospitality during this stay.

² Mason W. Moseley, "Contentious Engagement: Understanding Protest Participation in Latin American Democracies", in *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, vol. 7, no. 3, December 2015, pp. 3-48, at <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1866802X1500700301> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

³ María Victoria Murillo, "Protestas, descontento y democracia en América Latina", in *Nueva Sociedad*, no. 294, July-August 2021, pp. 4-13, at https://static.nuso.org/media/articles/downloads/COY_Murillo_294.pdf (date of access: June 8, 2022).

However, although the analysis of political contexts and social demands is vital to explain the onset of protests, a fundamental question remains: why is it that, under similar circumstances, some people decide to join social mobilisations while others decide not to do so? Research on social protest and its determinants is inherently multidimensional.⁴ Focusing on the individual level, this study analyses the willingness of citizens to protest in 18 Latin American countries. Undoubtedly, on the one hand, expressing a willingness to participate in protests does not equate to involvement in any of them. On the other hand, it does reveal the significance that people in the region attach to the possibility of taking to the streets in defence of a specific cause.

The premise of this study is that citizens expect their experiences and interests to be taken into account by those in power. Thus, for many people, mobilising and protesting are resources that can be used to force governments to take these experiences and interests into account, especially when they are politically disadvantaged. In this sense, one of the contributions of this article is to show that feelings of social discrimination are associated with the willingness to mobilise. The analysis reveals that people who feel aggrieved by some form of discrimination are more willing to protest than those who have not had this experience. Another way of feeling politically disadvantaged is to identify with a political group that lacks the possibility to participate in public decision-making. The data indicate that the willingness to protest is higher among citizens who identify with parties that oppose the government in power. When the executive branch is occupied by a political group or party other than their own, citizens express a greater willingness to mobilise. Together, identifying with the political opposition and experiencing social discrimination constitutes a unique situation of disadvantage. Not only does the government in power have no reason to promote the interests of these people, but they are also treated unfairly at a social level. Thus, the motivation to participate in protests is especially strong among people who feel aggrieved by some form

⁴ For a systematisation of the factors associated with individuals' participation in protests and movements, see Paul Almeida, *Movimientos sociales*, Buenos Aires, CLACSO, 2020, pp. 182-197, in <https://doi.org/10.2307/jctv1gm010t.9> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

of discrimination and, at the same time, identify with political forces outside the government.

Social protest: from social grievance to representative demand

Social protest is a contentious recourse that aims to influence the conduct of public affairs, public policy or the exercise of state authority. It is contentious in that it resorts to an extensive repertoire of actions to demand, oppose or contest. “Repertoires of contention” can be either somewhat peaceful or somewhat violent and make use of multiple symbolic and technological resources.⁵ Thus, through protest, governors are called to account or to rectify measures that offend the citizenry. In other words, the purpose of protests is to influence public opinion, political parties and decision-makers so that political decisions are responsive and sensitive to the grievances expressed through repertoires of contention.

It must be said that social protests are not equivalent to social movements. As Philippe Hanna, Frank Vanclay, Esther Jean Langdon and Jos Arts show, social movements can express themselves through cycles of protest, but not every protest is indicative of the unfolding of a social movement.⁶ Likewise, the outcomes of protests are uncertain. Grievances may be legitimate and popular support may be widespread. Even so, the changes and consequences may not be immediate or may never materialise. Moreover, people who engage in protests may be forced to pay high costs, and not only in time or resources. Under certain circumstances, their physical or emotional

⁵ Donatella Della Porta, “Repertoires of Contention”, in David A Snow, Donatella Della Porta, Bert Klandermans and Doug McAdam (eds.), *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*, Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, 2013; Charles Tilly, *Regimes and Repertoires*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2010.

⁶ Philippe Hanna, Frank Vanclay, Esther Jean Langdon and Jos Arts, “Conceptualizing Social Protest and the Significance of Protest Actions to Large Projects”, in *The Extractive Industries and Society*, vol. 3, no. 1, January 2016, pp. 217-239, at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.10.006> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

integrity may be at risk, if not their very lives. So the basic question remains: what motivates people to protest?

The first expectation of this study is that people who feel unfairly treated or experience a sense of grievance because of their social identity, beliefs or group membership will be more likely to protest, as shown in Barrington Moore's classic study.⁷ Feelings of dissatisfaction or grievance have always been considered important predictors of protest participation since the earliest studies on "relative deprivation". Of course, the literature has shown that many other factors are at play, from the ability to mobilise resources for protest to the way in which the conditions provoke discontent and the context of collective action are "framed" or "shaped". The upsurge of social protest is associated with collective identities, moral outrage, social networks, symbolic 'framing', emotional activation, technological innovations in the form of social networks and mobile devices, among other factors.⁸ In addition, various types of threats can stimulate collective mobilisation.⁹

Indeed, models for explaining participation in mobilisations and protests are becoming increasingly complex.¹⁰ One such model, for example, offers an innovative theory of political participation that considers the "costs of abstaining".¹¹ For both electoral participation and participation in protests, models have developed complex explanations based on the costs

⁷ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1978.

⁸ A systematic review of these debates can be found in Jacquelin van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans, "The Social Psychology of Protest," in *Current Sociology*, vol. 61, no. 5-6, September 2013, pp. 886-905, at <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0011392113479314> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

⁹ Paul D. Almeida, "The Role of Threat in Collective Action," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi and Holly J. McCammon (eds.), *The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, 2a. ed., Oxford, Wiley Blackwell, 2019, pp. 43-62, at <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119168577.ch2> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

¹⁰ J. van Stekelenburg and B. Klandermans, *op. cit.*

¹¹ S. Erdem Aytaç and Susan C. Stokes, *Why Bother?: Rethinking Participation in Elections and Protests*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2019, at <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108690416> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

of participation. However, as S. Erdem Aytaç and Susan C. Stokes have shown, people also take into account the consequences of staying away, staying at home instead of voting or attending simply as witnesses to growing social mobilisations.¹² Thus, taking into account the costs of participating, the psychological costs of abstaining, plus the value attached to the goals of social protests, the number of people taking part in the mobilisation, also including the social pressure to participate or not, and finally, the risks of repression are all factors that contribute to predicting contentious behaviour. According to Aytaç and Stokes, these elements help to resolve various unknowns.¹³ For example, why does state repression sometimes succeed in suppressing protests, but at other times provoke the opposite reaction, leading to a massive increase in mobilisation? Among other factors, people's emotional and moral reaction to increased repression can make it inherently more costly to stand aside.¹⁴

At the same time, the possibility of protesting is a strategic resource to force the government to take citizens' demands into account. So to speak, social protest is a way of demanding political representation and answers from the government. Democracy is a regime of government in which authority is chosen in regular, free and fair elections. The ballot box defines the candidates who will assume a position of popular representation, whether it is the executive branch or a seat in the legislature. In that sense, people who voted for the politicians or parties in government may have an expectation that the government will advance policies they favour.¹⁵ Conversely, voters who voted for losing candidates can also expect that policies will not primarily benefit them, or that actions will be promoted that, because of interests or ideology, they dislike. While "winning" voters

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 76-82.

¹³ *Idem.*

¹⁴ See also S.E. Aytaç, Luis Schiumerini and Susan Stokes, "Why Do People Join Backlash Protests? Lessons from Turkey", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 62, no. 6, July 2018, pp. 1205-1228, at <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716686828> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

¹⁵ Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and S.C. Stokes, "Elections and Representation", in A. Przeworski, S.C. Stokes, and B. Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 29-55; G. Bingham Powell Jr., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000.

expect the government to represent their interests, “losing” voters expect less benefit, if not harm, to their interests.

Extensive literature confirms that differences between winners and losers are reflected in system legitimacy, institutional trust, satisfaction with democracy and various types of attitudes.¹⁶ In Latin America, this difference is accentuated as the quality of democracy changes.¹⁷ In strong democracies, the difference is smaller; in lower quality democracies, being represented in government, or the lack of representation, has more implications and the differences are larger.

In the same way, voters’ position *vis-à-vis* the government in office may be decisive in explaining attitudes towards social protest. People who identify with those in power have less need to mobilise. Rather, they would expect the authorities to fulfil their commitments or to be ideologically coherent. On the other hand, those who would have preferred other parties to govern may be more likely to resort to protest actions to influence a government with which they fail to sympathise.

A second expectation in this study is to observe a difference in attitudes in those who favour social mobilisation and protest against voters sympathetic to the government and voters sympathetic to opposition parties. Those who do not feel represented by the government in office will be more willing to protest. In other words, people who demand government action, but who are less likely to have their interests or demands taken into account by the authorities, will be more likely to protest. In this sense, original research by Paul Almeida, Eugenio Sosa, Allen Cordero Ulate and Ricardo Argueta reveals that, in fact, subordinate political parties can overcome resource

¹⁶ *I.e.*, Christopher J. Anderson, André Blais, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan and Ola Listhaug, *Losers’s Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; Sergio Martini and Mario Quaranta, “Political Support Among Winners and Losers: Within-And Between-Country Effects of Structure, Process and Performance in Europe”, in *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 58, no. 1, February 2019, pp. 341-361, at <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12284> (Date of access: June 8, 2022).

¹⁷ Alejandro Monsiváis-Carrillo, “Permissive Winners? The Quality of Democracy and the Winner-Loser Gap in the Perception of Freedoms”, in *Political Studies*, vol. 70, no. 1, February 2022, pp. 173-194, at <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720952230> (date of access: June 8, 2022)

deficiencies by electorally mobilising citizens who already have experience of participating in social movements.¹⁸

The third expectation is that those who identify with opposition parties and at the same time feel aggrieved by discriminatory treatment will be more likely to protest. Forms of discrimination depend to a large extent on the social and political context, and often have deep-seated roots, as in the United States where civil rights mobilisations are a reaction to a deeply entrenched system of racism. Grievances caused by discrimination can motivate protests, moreover, when combined with the expectation that political power will overlook the defence of the interests of those aggrieved by unfair treatment stemming from prejudice and stereotyping. In other words, the collective sense of grievance may increase the willingness to protest exactly when the prioritising of the interests of other groups by the government is perceived.

Data and variables

The analysis is based on data from the 2020 Latinobarómetro, which brings together surveys conducted in 18 Latin American countries.¹⁹ All surveys are nationally representative and were conducted between 2020 and 2021. In total, the database consists of 20 204 observations.

The dependent variable is the *willingness to mobilise and protest* (see Graph A1 in the Annex). This variable is a continuous variable with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 1, with mean = 0.65 and standard deviation of 0.31. *Willingness to mobilise and protest* is the common factor underlying five variables measured on a scale of 1 to 10; a factor that explains 75% of the joint variance. These five variables consistently measure the same dimension (Cronbach's alpha = 0.912) and answer the question: Q59ST. "On

¹⁸ P. Almeida, Eugenio Sosa, Allen Cordero Ulate and Ricardo Argueta, "Protest Waves and Social Movement Fields: The Micro Foundations of Campaigning for Subaltern Political Parties", in *Social Problems*, vol. 68, no. 4, November 2021, pp. 831-851, at <https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spab012> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

¹⁹ The 2020 data and questionnaire can be downloaded free of charge from the Latinobarómetro website: <https://www.latinobarometro.org/latContents.jsp>.

a scale of 1 to 10, where '1' means 'not at all willing' and '10' means 'Completely willing'. How willing would you be to demonstrate and protest for...?": "Higher wages and better working conditions"; "Better health and education"; "Defend democratic rights"; "Fight against corruption and abuses"; and "A more egalitarian society".

It is important to note that the dependent variable is an attitudinal indicator. It is not intended to provide information about respondents' actual experiences of participating in protests. It only indicates the extent to which a person would be willing to protest for any of the abovementioned reasons. This is undoubtedly a limitation of survey data that measures subjective reports and attitudes. However, as an indicator composed of several variables, it is a useful measure to consistently assess a general propensity to participate in mobilisations and protests among Latin American citizens.

How, then, to measure the sense of collective grievance that can trigger repertoires of contention? The 2020 Latinobarómetro questionnaire offers an alternative through the question Q57ST: "Would you describe yourself as part of a discriminated group against in (Country), or not? Discrimination is a form of social injustice based on the stigmatisation of certain social groups on the basis of morally irrelevant characteristics such as skin colour, ethnicity or others. As Moreau points out, discrimination harms people's *deliberative freedoms*, or the right that each person has to choose certain values and to conduct their lives according to those values.²⁰ The harm occurs when these freedoms are affected by the stigmatisation of social groups on the basis of skin tone, gender or other characteristics of individuals. In this case, however, it is not clear why the respondent identifies as a victim of discrimination. What matters, from the point of view of this study, is that this feeling is expressed in relation to their membership of a social group. It is not a purely individual feeling of discrimination, but a feeling that originates from "being part of a group that is discriminated against". The variable is then called a *victim of group discrimination*. Whatever the reasons for discrimination, this

²⁰ Sophia Moreau, "What Is Discrimination?," in *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 2, Spring 2010, pp. 143-179, at <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2010.01181.x> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

question captures a state of mind of injustice or grievance that originates from belonging to a certain social group. In the database, 21.7% of the sample report feeling part of a social group that is discriminated against, the rest, 78.3%, do not consider themselves part of a group that is discriminated against.


The second independent variable is *political identification*, which is based on question Q50STGBS.A. This variable distinguishes between voters who “would vote for the governing party” if the elections were “this Sunday”, those who “would vote for opposition parties”, and those who would cancel their vote or not vote at all. While the questionnaire includes other categories, such as “do not know”, “no answer”, or “would vote for an unregistered party”, these residual categories are dropped from the analysis.

Finally, this study considers several covariables. On the one hand, it considers two indicators of the perception of fairness with which the political system functions. The first measures the perception that income distribution in the country is fair (1=“Strongly disagree”, 4=“Strongly agree”); the second measures the belief that corruption in the country is greater than a year ago (0=“Strongly disagree”, 1=“Strongly agree”). On the other hand, socio-demographic variables are included: gender, age groups, educational level, ethnic self-ascription and a variable that measures the level of well-being in the household based on a list of household goods and services (question S26). Finally, an indicator variable is included for each country-survey to control for heterogeneity due to the clustered nature of the observations. The measurement procedure is available from the author. It is omitted here due to space limitations.

Results

What factors influence the willingness to protest, does whether one feels part of a discriminated group make a difference, and does identification with the ruling party or with opposition parties play a role? To answer these questions, the relationship between the independent variables and willingness to protest using linear regressions with robust standard errors will be assessed. The results can be found in the Annex to this arti-

Graph 1. Willingness to mobilize and protest




Source: Own elaboration with data from Latinobarómetro 2020.

cle. To better illustrate these results, Graphs A1 and A2 in the Annex present the estimated value of the willingness to mobilise and protest when the independent variables take on specific values. The linear predictions seen in these graphs model the relationship between the variables of interest holding all covariables constant at their mean value.

The analysis reveals that people who feel part of a group that is discriminated against have a higher propensity to mobilise or protest. As seen in the left-hand panel of Graph 1, when a person considers themselves to be part of a group that is discriminated against, on average, their willingness to protest is 0.71 on a scale of 0 to 1 (with a 95% confidence interval between 0.70 and 0.73). In comparison, those who do not share this sense of collective grievance have an average willingness to participate in protests of 0.65 (95% CI = 0.65, 0.66).

Similarly, as shown in the right-hand panel of Graph 1, citizens' party-political identification is decisive. The inclination to participate in contentious actions is higher amongst people who identify with opposition parties 0.72 (95%CI= 0.71, 0.73)—those who would vote for an opposition party in the next elections, as suggested by the findings of P. Almeida, E. Sosa,

Graph 2. Willingness to protest: interactive model




A. Cordero Ulate and R. Argueta.²¹ In second place are voters who would ratify their support for the ruling party at the ballot box (0.66, 95%CI = 0.65, 0.67). Finally, those least likely to protest are voters who are disaffected with political parties (0.63, 95%CI= 0.62, 0.64).

The next question is to assess whether the disposition to social protest is influenced by the party-political identification of people who consider themselves akin to a group suffering discrimination. The results of the analysis are shown in Graph 2. It is interesting to note, in the first instance, that the propensity to protest among voters who identify with the ruling party is not affected by whether or not they feel aggrieved by discrimination. Whether or not they consider themselves to be part of a group that is discriminated against by others, their attitude towards protest is the same, statistically speaking. In contrast, by seeing themselves as part of a collectivity that suffers discrimination, this does increase the willingness to protest among citizens sympathetic to the opposition and even among those who do not identify with any party. The inclination to protest is higher among opposition voters who consider themselves aggrieved by discrimination (0.76,

²¹ P. Almeida, E. Sosa, A. Cordero Ulate and R. Argueta, *op. cit.*

Graph 3. Linear effects on willingness to march and protest in Latin America



Source: Own elaboration with estimates from model 2 in Table A2.

95%CI = 0.74, 0.78). However, the most significant change is among voters who feel disaffected from political parties. While this group has the lowest propensity to mobilise, this attitude changes when they have experienced a form of discrimination, from 0.61 to 0.69 (95%CI=0.68, 0.71).

The results suggest that the willingness to protest depends on whether citizens feel a sense of identification with the government in power, especially when they consider themselves part of a social group that is discriminated against. The sense of grievance at being unjustifiably stigmatised encourages revolt, especially when the government cannot be expected to do anything about it.

Other interesting findings are illustrated in Graph 3. This graph shows the magnitude of the influence of the variables included in the models on the willingness to protest. When the points and their confidence intervals cross the zero line, it means that the correlation is not statistically significant. If they move away from that line to the right, the impact is positive; if they

move away to the left, the impact is negative. As can be seen, the propensity to mobilise decreases as people think that income distribution is fair. The belief that political corruption has increased has the opposite effect: it increases the willingness to participate in protests. These results are indicative that expectations that the political system is conducted fairly are associated with the dependent variable. If income distribution is perceived as unfair, people will be more willing to mobilise; if corruption has increased, they will be more willing to mobilise.

At the same time, the willingness to protest varies significantly depending on people's socio-demographic characteristics. Holding everything else constant, women are less willing to engage in protests than men; among older age groups, willingness to participate also decreases progressively when compared to 16–25-year-olds; among young people, greater “biographical readiness” to engage in mobilisations is found.²² Individuals' level of education also has a positive influence on their willingness to participate in protests. Compared to people who consider themselves “mestizo”, “indigenous” or “Afro-descendant”, those who identify themselves as “white” are less willing to protest. Finally, those who report greater domestic well-being are not those who, on average, would engage in contentious politics, but those who live with greater deprivation.

Conclusions

This article analyses Latin American citizens' willingness to participate in protests and social mobilisations. The results suggest that citizens contemplate participating in protests to make the government behave responsibly, particularly when they are in a disadvantaged position. One of the main findings of this study is that people who feel they are stigmatised and treated unfairly are more likely to mobilise than those who do not have such experiences. Specifically, when someone considers themselves to be part of a group that is discriminated against, their motivation

²² Doug McAdam, “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer”, in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 92, no. 1, July 1986, p. 70, at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2779717> (date of access: June 8, 2022).

to participate in protests is higher. This result is consistent with another empirical finding: people who identify themselves as mestizo, indigenous or Afro-descendant are more willing to protest than those who identify themselves as “white”. It may well be that those who consider themselves “white” suffer less discrimination and degrading treatment than others. This relationship certainly merits more rigorous analysis in Latin America.

On the other hand, the analysis also reveals that voters who identify with opposition parties are more inclined to protest than those who identify with the governing party. In other words, mobilisation is a resource to demand answers from a government that is known to be more attentive to promoting the interests of voters who support it. The results also show that the willingness to protest is greater when people feel part of a discriminated group and identify with the opposition parties. Even people who feel disaffected with political parties are more likely to protest when they feel discriminated against.

Of course, expressing a willingness to engage in protests and mobilisations is not the same as participating in social movements or contentious actions. It is one thing to say that one has a favourable attitude towards protest and another to actually participate in protest. Nonetheless, the analysis presented here contributes to a broader understanding of individual attitudes towards social protest in Latin America. The analysis suggests that citizens see the possibility of mobilising to defend or promote certain causes as a mechanism of political influence when they cannot rely on the government in power to do so. When people consider that the government represents visions or interests other than their own, they turn to protest as an alternative mechanism of political influence. This attitude is accentuated when they experience grievances or injustices, such as feeling part of a social group that is discriminated against.


In Latin America, unmet expectations and experiences of grievance are still prevalent in large segments of society. At the same time, the capacity of political parties to represent this unrest is precarious. Instead, political polarisation, electoral misalignment and institutional disaffection prevail in the face of inadequate government response. In this context, as this study shows, social mobilisations and protests are perceived as an instrument to demand answers to the persistent deficits in democratic representation in the region.

Annex

Table A1. Descriptive statistics					
Variable	N=	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Dependent variable					
Willingness to mobilise and protest	18 593	0.65	0.31	0	1
Independent variables					
Victim of group discrimination	19 759	0.21	0.41	0	1
Political identification					
None/Null vote	19 204	0.39	0.49	0	1
With the Government	19 204	0.18	0.39	0	1
With the opposition	19 204	0.21	0.41	0	1
Control variables					
Fair income distribution	19 321	1.90	0.75	1	4
More corruption	19 005	0.70	0.30	0	1
Democratic satisfaction	19 258	0.35	0.31	0	1
Gender: Women	20 204	0.52	0.50	0	1
Age [16 to 25]	20 204	0.22	0.42	0	1
26 to 40	20 204	0.32	0.47	0	1
41 to 60	20 204	0.30	0.46	0	1
61 and over	20 204	0.15	0.36	0	1
Educational level	20 204	4.29	1.77	0	7
Ethnic group [Mestizo]	19 750	0.40	0.49	0	1
Indigenous	19 750	0.11	0.31	0	1
White	19 750	0.22	0.41	0	1
Black or mulatto	19 750	0.11	0.31	0	1
Others	19 750	0.16	0.37	0	1
Domestic well-being	19 565	0.42	0.31	0	1


Source: Own elaboration with data from Latinobarómetro 2020.

Graph A1. Willingness to march and protest (histogram)



Source: Own elaboration with data from Latinobarómetro 2020.

Graph A2. Willingness to protest in Latin America (2020)



Source: Own elaboration with data from Latinobarómetro 2020.

Table A2. Determinants of willingness to mobilise and protest		
	M1	M2
Victim of group discrimination	0.06***	0.03**
	[0.006]	[0.013]
Political identification [Government]		
None/Null vote	-0.03***	-0.04***
	[0.007]	[0.008]
Opposition	0.05***	0.05***
	[0.008]	[0.009]
Victim of group discrimination x Political identification [Government]		
None/Null vote		0.05**
		[0.016]
Opposition		0.02
		[0.017]
Fair income distribution	-0.02***	-0.02***
	[0.004]	[0.004]
More corruption	0.06***	0.06***
	[0.010]	[0.010]
Gender: Women	-0.05***	-0.05***
	[0.005]	[0.005]
Age [16 to 25]		
26 to 40	-0.03***	-0.03***
	[0.007]	[0.007]
41 to 60	-0.06***	-0.06***
	[0.007]	[0.007]
61 and over	-0.11***	-0.11***
	[0.010]	[0.010]
Educational level	0.01***	0.01***
	[0.002]	[0.002]
Ethnic group [Mestizo]		
Indigenous	0.01	0.01
	[0.010]	[0.010]

White	-0.03***	-0.03***
	[0.008]	[0.008]
Black or mulatto	0.01	0.01
	[0.009]	[0.009]
Others	0.01	0.01
	[0.015]	[0.015]
Domestic well-being	-0.04***	-0.04***
	[0.010]	[0.010]
Constant	0.73***	0.74***
	[0.022]	[0.022]
Observations	12 777	12 777
R-cuadrada	0.097	0.098
Includes country indicators	yes	yes

Notes: Linear regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$