

Middle East: The Unfulfilled Resolutions of the Security Council

Medio Oriente: las resoluciones incumplidas del Consejo de Seguridad

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Abstract

The Palestinian Question, one of the oldest files in the U.N. Security Council agenda, exposes the incapacity of the Council to enforce its own resolutions. Periods of crisis during the two years of Mexico's membership to the Council set the background to portray systematic breaches of those resolutions in three main aspects: Israeli settlements, the Gaza blockade, and the deterioration of Jerusalem's special status. Even when the evidence signals towards the lack of political will, there are regional and domestic factors, that exacerbate the Council's inability to implement its own resolutions and therefore, that inhibit the realization of the "two-state solution."



Resumen

La cuestión palestina, uno de los expedientes de más larga data en la agenda, se caracteriza por la incapacidad del Consejo de Seguridad para implementar sus propias resoluciones. Episodios críticos durante la participación de México en el Consejo exponen el incumplimiento sistemático de dichas resoluciones en tres aristas principales: asentamientos israelíes, el bloqueo de Gaza y el estatuto de Jerusalén. Aun cuando la evidencia apunta hacia la falta de voluntad política, factores de índole regional e interno, exacerbaban la incapacidad para implementar las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad y, por lo tanto, en la materialización de la "solución de dos Estados".



Keywords

Israel, Palestine, settlements, two-state solution, Jerusalem, Gaza blockade



Palabras clave

Israel, Palestina, asentamientos, solución de dos Estados, Jerusalén, bloqueo de Gaza

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Introduction

In October 1991, the Madrid Conference took place, at which for the first time Israel's leaders sat down at the table with representatives from Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. This was the starting point for negotiations that resulted in the Oslo Accords (1993 and 1995)¹ and in the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan (1994).² The Oslo Accords include a declaration of principles and a provisional framework for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on the "two-state solution." This is the vision of a region in which two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side, in peace and within secure and recognized bor-

¹ General Assembly/Security Council, "Declaration of Principles on Provisions on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" [Oslo Accords I], A/48/486, S/26560, October 11, 1993, pp. 4-9, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/1L%20PS_930913_DeclarationPrinciplesnterimSelf-Government%28Oslo%20Accords%29.pdf (date of access: June 10, 2023); and Security Council, "Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip" [Oslo Accords II], S/1997/357, September 28, 1995, pp. 4-28, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/1L%20PS_950928_InterimAgreementWest-BankGazaStrip%28OsloII%29.pdf (date of access: June 10, 2023).

² "Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," in United Nations Peacemaker, at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/1L%20Jo_941026_PeaceTreatyIsraelJordan.pdf (date of access: June 10, 2023).

ders.³ Although the Accords reiterated the spirit of the partition plan set out in resolution 181(II)[A]⁴ of the U.N. General Assembly, this intention has not materialized. There are setbacks in place of progress, while the window of opportunity for their implementation is closing.⁵

The Palestinian issue is one of the longest-standing files on the Security Council's agenda, which has resulted in a dense web of resolutions. To date, the Council has adopted more than 100 resolutions on the issue, 50 of which were adopted at the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. The file, however, has been characterized by the limited capacity of the Council to implement its own decisions and by the deterioration of the situation on the ground. In the last two years, during which Mexico was a member of the Council, we witnessed growing tensions, the total stagnation of the political process and countless acts unfavorable to creating an environment conducive to dialogue.

Given the inaction of the Council, the gradual disappearance of the Oslo principles is plain to see. In her November 2021 intervention before the Council, the president of the International Crisis Group, Comfort Ero, summarized this situation as follows: "The laws are on the books. The tools are in the Council's hands. What is lacking is the willingness to use those laws and tools to advance peace in Israel-Palestine."⁶ Even though the evidence makes clear the lack of political will, there are other regional and internal factors that have influenced the limited implementation of the Council's resolutions and, therefore, the full realization of the "two-state solution."

³ Security Council, Resolution 1397 (2002), S/RES/1397(2002), March 12, 2002, at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1397\(2002\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1397(2002)) (date of access: June 10, 2023).

⁴ "Future Government of Palestine," A/RES/181(II)[A], November 29, 1947, at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/667160> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

⁵ See Nickolay Mladenov's intervention at the Security Council, "Top Official on Middle East Peace Process Spotlights Continued Violence, Settlement Activities in Briefing to Security Council," press release, SC/14398, December 21, 2020, at <https://press.un.org/en/2020/sc14398.doc.htm> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

⁶ Speech by Comfort Ero in the Security Council, "The Situation in Middle East, Including the Question Palestine," S/PV.8913, November 20, 2021, p. 7, at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3949984> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

This article focuses on the Security Council's discussions on the conflict in the Middle East during the 2021-2022 period. Notably, in three manifestations of the Israeli occupation, each with its respective geographical delimitation and normative reference: Israeli settlements, which mainly have repercussions for the West Bank and East Jerusalem, condemned in resolution 2334 (2016);⁷ the blockade of the Gaza Strip, tightened in the last decade and addressed in resolution 1860 (2009);⁸ and attempts to alter the demographic, historical, legal and cultural character of Jerusalem, sanctioned in resolutions 476 (1980) and 478 (1980).⁹ A succinct description is presented below of the prevailing dynamics in the Council when dealing with this issue. Next, some of the flagrant violations of the Council's resolutions are presented against the background of episodes of crisis and a summary of Mexico's position over the two-year period. Finally, based on Mexico's own experience, actions are suggested that could support the implementation of Security Council resolutions, with a view to moving forward on the resolution of the conflict.

Setting the scene: the dynamics in the Security Council

In general terms, there is support for the "two-state solution" among the 15 members of the Council. This was not the case during the four years of President Trump's administration, who had a different perspective on the resolution of the conflict that led him to reject resolution 2334 (2016), adopted at the end of Barack Obama's presidency.¹⁰ Even though

⁷ S/RES/2334(2016), December 23, 2016, at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2334\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2334(2016)) (date of access: June 10, 2023).

⁸ S/RES/1860(2009), January 8, 2009, at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/1860\(2009\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1860(2009)) (date of access: June 10, 2023).

⁹ S/RES/476(2016), June 30, 1980, at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2334\(2016\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2334(2016)) (date of access: June 10, 2023); and S/RES/478(1980), August 20, 1980, at [https://undocs.org/S/RES/478\(1980\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/478(1980)) (date of access: June 10, 2023).

¹⁰ The White House, *Peace to Prosperity. A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People*, Washington D.C., January 2020, at <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

a gradual change in U.S. positions was perceived during 2021, this was not accompanied by measures to reverse actions taken by the previous administration or to encourage confidence in the new administration of Joseph Biden.¹¹ Although it sometimes expressed disapproval of settler violence, it was not until November 2022 that the United States explicitly condemned Israeli settlements and related activities.¹² This concern previously expressed by Mexico and the other delegations regained relevance in the face of the arrival of the new Israeli Government, backed by extremist settlers and with little time for the “two-state solution.”

On the other hand, the work of the Middle East Peace Quartet, made up of the United States, Russia, the U.N. and the European Union,¹³ remains stagnant due to the U.S. refusal to hold high-level meetings or issue statements. During periods of crisis, the Council’s passivity was the result of the United States’ opposition to adopting any product. Its delegation argued that any pronouncement would have negative repercussions on the efforts being carried out on the ground and that it would be more convenient to wait for “the right moment.”

Among the rest of the permanent members, the United Kingdom took a more constructive approach, although its position is close to the United States. Russia frequently accused the United States of being the reason why there was no progress in the file. For its part, China insisted, supported by Russia, on the need to promote greater activism by the Quartet, and in the various negotiations it supported the Palestinian proposals. France, in accordance with its principled tradition, criticized violations of international law, and together with China, Norway, the United Arab Emirates and Tunisia, demanded extraordinary meetings in critical periods and promoted the adoption of pronouncements, even though this met with little success.

¹¹ The reopening of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Washington, reversing the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and the reopening of the United States Consulate in Jerusalem (in charge of Palestinian affairs).

¹² Speech by Lynda Thomas-Greenfield in the Security Council, “The Situation in Middle East, Including the Question Palestine,” S/PV.9203, November 28, 2022, p. 4, at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3996315> (access date: June 10, 2023).

¹³ See resolution 1397 (2002).

The elected members generally reiterated their support for the “two-state solution,” while warning about the pressing need to establish a political perspective that would break the cycles of violence. Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates, as representatives of the Arab group, were responsible for conveying the Palestinian position. Of note is the less prominent role of the United Arab Emirates, despite having a direct avenue for dialogue with Israel thanks to the Abraham Accords.

The unfulfilled resolutions

During the two-year period, there were frequent violations of U.N. resolutions that hinder the viability of the “two-state solution.” A non-exhaustive list includes the following violations:

- The construction of more than 14 000 Israeli housing units.¹⁴
- The demolition of 1865 Palestinian structures, including some donated by the international community, with the consequent displacement of the civilian population.¹⁵
- The increase in attacks against civilians, causing the death of 540 Palestinians, 55 Israelis and more than 30 000 wounded.¹⁶
- The inability to dismantle terrorist capabilities, prevent rocket and incendiary device attacks from Gaza, curb settler violence, and limit the use of inflammatory rhetoric. The latter is attributable to both parties.
- Recurrent attempts to alter the status of Jerusalem, undermining Jordan’s role as custodian of Muslim and Christian holy sites.¹⁷

¹⁴ Security Council, “Implementation of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016): Report of the Secretary-General,” S/2022/945, December 14, 2022, at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3998891> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

¹⁵ OCHA, “Data on Demolition and Displacement in the West Bank,” at <https://www.ochaopt.org/data/demolition> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

¹⁶ OCHA, “Data on Casualties,” at <https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

¹⁷ “Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” p. 6.

Resolution 2334 (2016) and Israeli settlements

As the most recent, though not only, resolution that sanctions Israeli settlements, the importance of resolution 2334 (2016) lies in the fact that it reaffirms key resolutions¹⁸ and internationally accepted parameters such as the Madrid terms of reference, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet Roadmap, which represent some of the multiple attempts to resolve the conflict. It should be noted that the resolution itself mandates the Secretary-General to present a quarterly report on progress in its implementation, which in turn is discussed in the Council.

In addition to being illegal under international law, Israeli settlements and linked activities—such as the confiscation and demolition of property, displacement and population transfer—threaten the viability of the “two-state solution” in accordance with the pre-1967 borders. The settlements are an obstacle to the geographical contiguity of the future Palestinian state, in addition to inhibiting the growth and urban planning of Palestinian towns. The constant presence of Israeli law enforcement to protect settlers creates an environment of coercion and provocation, fostering the emergence of violent flashpoints that impact the daily activities of the civilian population. Furthermore, settlements limit the exploitation of natural resources, particularly the consumption of drinking water, and the development of agricultural activities, a source of subsistence for thousands of Palestinian families.

Violence between Palestinians and Israeli settlers is not a recent phenomenon. Incidents in places like Hebron were frequent in the 1990s.¹⁹

¹⁸ Relevant resolutions on the Palestinian question: ceasefire and violence—242 (1967) and 338 (1973)—, Israeli settlements—446 (1979), 1452 (1979), 465 (1980) and 2334 (2016)—, the blockade to Gaza—1860 (2009)—, the status of Jerusalem—476 (1980) and 478 (1980)— and calls to resume negotiations—139 (2002), 1551 (2003), 1850 (2003). These can be consulted at “U.N. Documents for Middle East, Including the Palestinian Question,” in Security Council Report, at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-resolutions/?ctype=Middle%20East%2C%20including%20the%20Palestinian%20Question&ctype=middle-east-including-the-palestinian-question (date of access: June 10, 2023).

¹⁹ Security Council, Resolution 904 (1994), S/RES/904(1994), March 18, 1994, at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/184518> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

Incursions by law enforcement into Palestinian areas, such as the one in which the Palestinian journalist Shireen Abu Akleh died,²⁰ or the virulent attacks in Huwara (near Nablus) in recent months, attest to the frequency and intensity of violence that accompanies the expansion of Israeli settlements.²¹

In adherence to its pacifist tradition and in respect for international law, Mexico repeatedly upheld its conviction that the only viable solution to meet the aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians is the “two-state solution.” It condemned the illegal character of Israeli settlements and, in line with U.N. resolutions, called for a halt to settlement construction and expansion, as well as the prevention of all acts of violence against civilians.

Resolutions 476 (1980) and 478 (1980) and the special status of Jerusalem

According to the Oslo Accords, together with the issues of refugees, settlements, security, borders and natural resources, the status of Jerusalem is to be defined in the final negotiation.²² Both Israelis and Palestinians claim the city as their legitimate capital, citing historical, religious and cultural links. In 1980, the Security Council adopted resolutions 476 and 478, rejecting legislative and administrative measures approved by Israel that sought to modify the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure and status of the city.²³

Over the past 24 months, there has been a serious deterioration in the city’s status. The confiscation and demolition of structures in the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem and the restrictions on movement

²⁰ Security Council, “Security Council Press Statement on Killing of Journalist Shireen Abu Akleh,” press release, sc/14891, May 13, 2022, at <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14891.doc.htm> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

²¹ This trend continued in 2023, prompting an emergency session and the adoption of a presidential declaration. “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” S/PRST/2023/1, February 20, 2023, at <https://undocs.org/S/PRST/2023/1> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

²² General Assembly/Security Council, *op. cit.*

²³ Resolution 2334 (2016) reaffirms the provisions of these two resolutions.

in the old city center and the vicinity of Al-Aqsa are of particular concern. Meanwhile, visits by Jewish worshippers, including members of the Israeli Government and Parliament, as well as incursions by law enforcement, increased. These actions by the Israeli authorities have progressively deteriorated Jordan's role as custodian of the holy sites, thus reducing its capacity for mediation.

The sensitivity surrounding the Jerusalem issue has had repercussions in the West Bank and Gaza. Evidence of this were the clashes in Jerusalem in May 2021, which led to a military confrontation in Gaza and the incursion of the Israeli army into Al-Aqsa during the Ramadan celebrations in April 2022. These crises prompted the call for closed consultations with the special coordinator, but without a statement from the Security Council.

Mexico, like other members, condemned the incursions by the forces of law and order into religious premises and called for respect for the freedom of movement, association and worship of Muslims, Jews and Christians alike. Likewise, the disproportionate use of force was condemned and support for Jordan's custodian role and mediation efforts was reiterated.

Resolution 1860 (2009) and the blockade of the Gaza Strip

In 2005, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and, in 2007, when Hamas took control, declared the enclave a "hostile entity." Since then, Israel has imposed restrictions on the movement of goods and people,²⁴ took control of air and maritime space, as well as the provision of electrical power and drinking water. Contrary to the Oslo provisions, the airport has not been restored, nor a port built in Gaza. Israel tightens these restrictions as a form of collective punishment in periods of tension or in retaliation for bombings against its territory.

In 2008, Israel began Operation Cast Lead, which aimed to shut down tunnels that were believed to be used by Hamas militants to infiltrate Israeli

²⁴ Israel controls the Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings, while Egypt controls the Rafah and Salah al-Din crossings.

territory. In the first of five wars between Israel and Gaza since the blockade began 15 years ago, hostilities lasted 22 days. As a result of that confrontation, the Security Council adopted resolution 1860 (2009), in which it calls for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Gaza.

In May 2021, attempts to alter the status of Jerusalem led to rocket bombardments from Gaza. The military confrontation on this occasion lasted 11 days, killing 258 Palestinians, including 67 children.²⁵ In response, an emergency session and closed consultation meetings of the Council, and a plenary session of the General Assembly were convened.

Despite the efforts of China, France, Norway and Tunisia, the United States insisted that a Council statement would harm peacemaking efforts. France presented a resolution to apply pressure, which it withdrew when the United States agreed to a press release welcoming the ceasefire, reached thanks to Egyptian mediation.²⁶

In early August 2022, the Israeli army carried out an operation to dismantle cells of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). In retaliation, PIJ launched more than 1000 rockets against Israel. After three days of bombing and without the involvement of Hamas, a ceasefire was reached. This time, the Security Council held an emergency meeting at which the special coordinator gave updated information on the mediation efforts.

With the exception of the United States, members shared their concerns about the passivity of the Security Council and the lack of a way forward to break the cycles of violence. Mexico condemned the bombings of Israel from Gaza and also questioned the lack of adherence to the humanitarian principles of precaution, proportionality and distinction. It called for the blockade of the Gaza Strip to be lifted in accordance with resolution 1860 (2009) and for the unimpeded entry of basic goods and humanitarian materials. Finally, it insisted that we cannot continue waiting for the “propitious moment,” but must instead take advantage of the synergies arising from the diversity of diplomatic efforts.

²⁵ OCHA, “Data on Casualties.”

²⁶ Security Council, “Security Council Press Statement on Gaza Cease Fire,” press release, SC/14527, May 22, 2021, at <https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14527.doc.htm> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

Mexico's position regarding the conflict

In line with its pacifist tradition and in favor of respect for international law, Mexico attended the discussions on the Palestinian issue with the purpose of contributing to a comprehensive and definitive solution to the conflict on the basis of a two-state solution. Between 2021-2022, the delegation participated constructively in the discussions and promoted greater activity of the Security Council, expressing its conviction that the Council cannot remain unmoved by the suffering of Israelis and Palestinians. In this light, it reiterated the need to promote decisive efforts by the Council to address the structural causes of the conflict.

With this perspective, in November 2021, the Mexican delegation, in its capacity as president of the Security Council, was responsible for coordinating a message from the Council on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. The text highlighted concerns about the expansion of Israeli settlements and settler violence. Likewise, the definition of the "two-state solution" was reaffirmed, based on international law and U.N. resolutions, a definition that had been rejected by the U.S. delegation in the previous four years. Although consensus was achieved, the United States expressed reservations regarding explicit recognition of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and the pre-1967 borders.²⁷

Although it is not strictly a product of the Security Council, as it is not a resolution or a presidential statement, this is one of the few pronouncements in the file to receive unanimous support. Recognition of Mexico's efforts was expressed in November 2022, when Council members insisted that Ghana, the president at the time, once again use the version promoted by the Mexican delegation. Likewise, this text served as the basis for the presidential statement of February 20, 2023.²⁸

²⁷ Security Council, "Statement by Ambassador Juan Ramón de la Fuente, President of the U.N. Security Council at the Commemorative Meeting for the U.N. International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People," November 29, 2021, at <https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/UNSC-Statement-for-International-Day-of-Solidarity-2021.pdf> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

²⁸ S/PRST/2023/1.

Outstanding tasks

Without no defined political horizon and if peace negotiations are not reactivated, it is likely that the Oslo principles will continue to be diluted and recurring cycles of violence will prevail. It is evident that the lack of political will has dominated the Council's inaction, which has exacerbated regional and internal factors.

Unlike 2009, when in his famous Bar-Ilan speech²⁹ Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu outlined the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, today the coalition in Government is proposing to continue to expand Israeli settlements, which, as has been shown, represents one of the greatest obstacles to making the “two-state solution” a reality.

On the regional issue, Iran represents a growing concern not only for Israel and the United States, but for other countries in the area, which is why the conflict in the Middle East has become secondary. On the other hand, the Palestinian issue has been a victim of “donor fatigue,” mainly in Europe, who are turning their attention to other crises with direct repercussions, such as the flows of refugees from Syria or Ukraine.

Despite the efforts of the international community and in accordance with the Oslo principles, there has been no progress in the institutional and financial strengthening of the Palestinian Authority, which is suffering a severe economic and legitimacy crisis. Without robust Palestinian institutional capacities, the United Nations Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA), in charge of providing public services and meeting basic demands of the population, in turn faces a severe budgetary crisis. Likewise, it is necessary to promote reconciliation within Palestine, including the call for elections, in line with the commitments of the Algiers Declaration.³⁰

²⁹ Benjamin Netanyahu, “Israeli PM Netanyahu’s Bar-Ilan Speech-English (2009),” in Economic Cooperation Foundation, June 14, 2009, at https://ecf.org.il/media_items/1141 (date of access: June 10, 2023).

³⁰ AFP, “Palestinian Rivals Hamas and Fatah Sign Reconciliation Deal in Algiers,” in World Is One News (WION), October 14, 2022, at <https://www.wionews.com/world/palestinian-rivals-hamas-and-fatah-sign-reconciliation-deal-in-algiers-525350> (date of access: June 10, 2023).

Coexistence between the Palestinian and Israeli populations is very complex. The Palestinian question is an issue that has not been part of the political debate in the last five Israeli elections. Among Palestinians, especially young people, a feeling of hopelessness and abandonment by the Palestinian Authority itself, the U.N. and the international community prevails. Currently, the main interaction between young Israelis and Palestinians occurs in the context of the occupation, that is, the encounters that young Palestinians have with Israeli soldiers at security crossings or military raids. Unfortunately, the leadership of the different parties has done little to win “the hearts and minds” of the new generations.

The international community must not remain passive. Some actions with a positive impact on the ground could be:

- Reiterate in multilateral forums and in bilateral interactions with the parties the undisputed support for the “two-state solution.”
- Urge respect for international law, especially international humanitarian law, as well as U.N. resolutions.
- Clearly establish and maintain the distinction between the territory of Israel and the Occupied Territories, in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2334 (2016), in the signing or renewal of trade or investment treaties.
- Maintain consistent funding for UNRWA.
- Promote the institutional strengthening of the Palestinian Authority, through training and exchange of good practices in electoral matters, tax collection or training of security forces, among others.

Final comments

As Mexico repeatedly stated, the responsibility for relaunching the peace process falls mainly on the parties involved. However, the international community and especially the Security Council have the obligation to foster and encourage such efforts. Today it is up to the international community to enforce the resolutions approved by the U.N. and the internationally accepted parameters to promote dialogue. Although the idea of making the “two-state solution” a reality seems remote, at present there is no oth-

er alternative that can secure the aspirations of the parties. It is therefore necessary to promote the confluence of multilateral and bilateral efforts, as well as behind-the-scenes efforts.

In December 2022, the final session in which Mexico participated, Ambassador Mona Juul (Norway), one of the architects of the Oslo negotiations, recalled what happened in that city, 30 years ago:

At the time, courageous negotiators from the Palestine Liberation Organization and the State of Israel, one of which considered the other a terrorist organization while being itself viewed by that other as an illegitimate State, came together to agree to disagree on the past, but also to agree on a way forward towards a two-State solution based on United Nations resolutions. That proves that it is possible to bring archenemies together around the negotiating table if there is political will and brave political leadership. We should never lose hope that this can be possible again. And we as a Council should unite and redouble our efforts to push for a two-State solution, which we all agree on.³¹

It is time, therefore, to take up the spirit of Oslo and, as members of the international community, identify points of overlap that will allow us to rebuild trust and lay the foundations for the resumption of dialogue. It is essential to sponsor efforts to meet the aspirations of the parties and to promote the peace and prosperity that thousands of Palestinian and Israeli families long for.

³¹ Speech by Mona Juul in the Security Council, “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question,” S/PV.9224, December 19, 2022, p. 6, at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3998586> (date of access: June 10, 2023).