

From Negotiation to Implementation: Expectations and Realities

*De la negociación a la instrumentación:
entre expectativas y realidades*

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Abstract:

This article discusses the change of focus of the national development paradigm as set out in the Mexican government's 2019-2024 National Development Plan and the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, both of which are in tune with the Comprehensive Development Plan (PDI) drafted by ECLAC to address the causes of underdevelopment in the nine southern states of Mexico and countries in the northern triangle of Central America, specifically, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. The PDI could produce positive results in keeping with the 2030 Agenda, provided its tenets are fully implemented and expectations are not undermined by economic factors, namely the COVID-19 crisis—the full impact of which has yet to be gauged—the viability of the current administrations' social projects, and U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Mexico and the subregion.



Resumen

El artículo se centra en el cambio de enfoque sobre el paradigma de desarrollo nacional en el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024 y la Estrategia Nacional para la Implementación de la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible, ambos en sintonía con el Plan de Desarrollo Integral diseñado por la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Cepal) para atender integralmente el subdesarrollo en los nueve estados del sur de la república mexicana y El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras. El Plan podría dejar resultados en línea con la Agenda 2030 si sus preceptos se implementan a cabalidad y la dimensión económica no limita sus expectativas, sobre todo teniendo en cuenta los impactos, que están por verse, de la crisis de la covid-19, la viabilidad de los proyectos sociales del gobierno actual, y de la política exterior de Estados Unidos con el país y la región.



Key Words:

2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, 2019-2024 National Development Plan, National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Mexico, Comprehensive Development Plan.



Palabras clave:

Agenda 2030 de Desarrollo Sostenible, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024, Estrategia Nacional para la Implementación de la Agenda 2030 en México, Plan de Desarrollo Integral.

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Introduction

I open this article with a brief overview of the process by which the current government administration has adopted the 2030 Agenda, at a time when a new approach has been taken to national development, as reflected in the 2019-2024 National Development Plan (PND) and the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Mexico, which, in essence, picks up on the priorities of the PND. My intention here is to illustrate the gap between discourse and the actual implementation of the 2030 Agenda on a regional level via the Comprehensive Development Plan (PDI) drawn up by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) to address, specifically and comprehensively, underdevelopment in Mexico's nine southern states, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, and the challenges posed by a post-COVID-19 scenario.

Mexico and the 2030 Agenda

Following the signing of the 2030 Agenda in 2015, Mexico stepped up its efforts to implement the 17 goals, 169 targets and over 230 indicators of the new agenda and incorporate these into its national plans and policies under the coordination of a Technical Committee Specialized in Sus-

tainable Development Goals (CTEODS), whose purpose is to guarantee that governments on a sub-national level use “standardized methodologies.” The 2030 Agenda addresses all three aspects of sustainable development—economic, social and environmental—and puts the individual and their rights (a rights-based approach) at the center of debate, as opposed to the State.

Its originality resides in its aspiration to bring about transformational change: not just to eradicate poverty, but to attack its root causes and the structural factors that perpetuate it. Accordingly, the Agenda states that a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach is needed, given that its goals bring into play diverse political areas (economic, social, environmental), actors (government agencies, NGOs, the private sector, civil society) and levels (national, state and municipal).¹

Based on the precedent of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the CTEODS opted to set up a Follow-up and Implementation Body in each state to promote and follow up on compliance with the 2030 Agenda. On a sub-national level, the National Conference of Governors complemented these efforts by creating, in June 2017, an Executive Commission for Compliance with the 2030 Agenda, which serves as a forum for the sharing of information and coordination between states and their respective municipalities. One decisive action was the inclusion of the sustainable development perspective in the expenditure budget, the Planning Law, the Social Development Law and the budgetary cycle of each state.² In the same vein, a few months earlier, in April 2017, the Chief of Staff of Mexico’s Office of the Presidency had set up the National Council on the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, formed by a series of actors representing academia, civil society, the private sector, international organizations,

¹ Rebecka Villanueva Ulfgard, “Mexico from the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals: Congruence and Dissonance in Development Compromises,” in R. Villanueva Ulfgard (coord.), *Mexico and the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Contributions and Challenges*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 17-51.

² Mexican government, *Informe nacional voluntario para el foro político de alto nivel sobre desarrollo sostenible. Bases y fundamentos en México para una visión del desarrollo sostenible a largo plazo. Avance en el cumplimiento de la Agenda 2030 y los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible*, México, 2018, available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/20125INFORME_NACIONAL_VOLUNTARIO_060718.pdf (date of reference: March 28, 2020).

local governments and government authorities. This initiative of the federal government was shored up in October 2019 when the Chamber of Deputies finally approved the creation of a Working Group to follow up on the 2030 Agenda, which met for the first time on March 11 of this year. The Senate followed suit in February 27 with the creation of a Special Commission to Follow Up on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Aside from the extensive coordination and consultation processes these mechanisms have committed to, since the Mexican Presidency assumed responsibility for implementing the SDGs, a new digital platform managed by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography has been set up³ and an institutional website that provides updates on the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, making it possible for diverse sectors and society at large to access information of interest.⁴

The 2019-2024 National Development Plan and the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Mexico

On June 12, 2019, the National Development Plan (PND) for the 2019-2024 presidential term was published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. Taking a marked change of approach and strategy, the Plan puts the country's most vulnerable sectors at the heart of its policies and views economic growth as a means of achieving social wellbeing, as opposed to an end in itself. It also advocates the (ideological) separation of economic and political power, and guarantees the rule of law will be enforced. As regards security, the development issue is seen as a problem related to the disintegration of the fabric of society, a lack of opportunities and a lack of ethics within institutions and society at large. To rectify this, a new approach designed to reconstruct the fabric of society and restore morality (comprehensive peace and security policies) is proposed. Finally, on the issue of migration, the PND proposes address-

³ See www.agenda2030.mx

⁴ See www.gob.mx/agenda2030

ing this phenomenon, not from a national security perspective, but from one of human security (in keeping with the international agreements Mexico is party to). Given that these measures are grounded primarily on the rule of law, human rights and social justice, it can safely be said that the current government administration is committed to the social component of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. To further reinforce this approach based on normative values, the economic model the current government administration seeks to apply, or at least the one that is broadly promoted by the executive branch and the ruling party, is that of a “moral economy”, even though this is not explicitly provided for in the PND. To sum up, the Plan’s premises acknowledge that the neo-liberal model has run its course globally because it is “amoral”, while its logic of maximizing the profits accumulated by society has relegated the function of the State as a guarantor of its citizens’ rights to a backseat and turned it into an agent of opportunities and privileges.⁵ Consequently, the PND offers a change in paradigm in the design of public policies aimed at instating a “post-neoliberal Mexican development model”, whose common denominator is an effective State that acts morally.⁶

On December 12, 2019, the Mexican Presidency unveiled its National Strategy,⁷ which picks up on the priorities of the PND and incorporates the goals and targets of the 2030 Agenda, the aim being to (better) align the sustainable development approach with the country’s specific goals. Furthermore, given the values that ostensibly shore up efforts to achieve the SDGs,

⁵ Ricardo Monreal Ávila, “Hacia una economía moral”, *El Universal*, November 25, 2019, at <https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/opinion/ricardo-monreal-avila/hacia-una-economia-moral> (date of reference: July 9, 2020).

⁶ For a more in-depth analysis of this trend, see Viri Ríos, “Reseña: hacia una economía moral”, in *Expansión Política* website, November 25, 2019, at <https://politica.expansion.mx/voce/2019/11/25/resena-hacia-una-economia-moral> (date of reference: July 9, 2020).

⁷ Mexican Presidency, *Estrategia Nacional para la Implementación de la Agenda 2030 en México. Para no dejar a nadie atrás: por el bien de todos, primero los pobres, el cuidado del medio ambiente y una economía incluyente*, Mexico, Mexican Presidency, November 2019, available at https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/514075/EN-A2030Mx_VF.pdf (date of reference: March 29, 2020). A year prior to this, the outgoing government administration presented its own version of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in Mexico. See Consejo Nacional de la Agenda 2030, *Estrategia nacional para la puesta en marcha de la Agenda 2030*, Mexico, November 2018.

it is of particular note that the phrase “leave no one behind” is referred to both explicitly and implicitly throughout the PND, to the extent that the National Strategy has embraced this as its guiding principle, while subsequent efforts committed to concern the use and coordination of instruments already announced in 2019-2020.

To effectively address certain goals and targets set forth in the National Strategy, particularly the one that states “In its cooperation efforts, Mexico needs to work with more stakeholders and increase its capacity to channel resources, assets, know-how, technology and experience toward priority regions, primarily Central America and the Caribbean, so as to help create conditions of wellbeing and prosperity that reduce forced migration”,⁸ it can be inferred that the most ambitious project of the current administration is the Comprehensive Development Plan (PDI). Presented by ECLAC Executive Secretary Alicia Bárcena on May 20, 2019 in Mexico City, the plan proposes creating a space for development shared by the nine southern states of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, which are the countries and the region with the highest indices of migration to the United States.

The Comprehensive Development Plan

The PDI is derived from the mandate ECLAC received on December 1, 2018 from the presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico for the drawing up of a plan for the diagnosis of migratory processes and the issuing of recommendations that take a fresh approach to this complex phenomenon.⁹ Based on the firm conviction that “migration should be an option and not an obligation”, the PDI focuses on the pressing need to introduce a new style of development to the region. As such, it focuses on the origin of the migratory cycle and encourages govern-

⁸ Mexican Presidency, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁹ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), *Hacia un nuevo estilo de desarrollo. Plan de Desarrollo Integral El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras-México. Diagnóstico, áreas de oportunidad y recomendaciones de la CEPAL* (LC/MEX/TS.2019/6), Mexico, ECLAC, 2019, available at https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/462720/34.Hacia_un_nuevo_estilo_de_desarrollo___Plan_de_Desarrollo_Integral_El.pdf (date of reference: March 28, 2020).

ments to put the rights of the migrant at the center of policies that apply to the other phases in the cycle (transit, destination and return). Drawing on an extensive diagnosis by ECLAC, the following structural causes of migration in the subregion are identified and summarized in the PDI: the labor productivity gap; demographics and the lack of jobs for young people; climate change and natural disasters, and violence. To address these challenges and enable the countries in question to move in the direction of development processes in line with the 2030 Agenda, ECLAC proposes 108 specific projects and 30 macroeconomic development recommendations (elimination of tax privileges, stronger tax administration and an increase in public investment equivalent to at least 25% of GDP), trade, energy and digital integration (infrastructure projects like railways, customs, an integrated electricity grid and gas pipelines between the south of Mexico and El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras), inclusive adaptation to climate change (the food self-sufficiency of rural communities, the decarbonization of the economy, the use of renewable energies promoted by these same communities), universal social welfare and protection for vulnerable populations (an increase in social spending and public services is recommended).¹⁰

Following this logic of addressing, specifically and comprehensively, the social and economic causes of migration in the subregion, which has become not just a priority, but a “banner of credibility” of sorts for the current administration, the latter would simultaneously be fulfilling one of the core goals of its PND and creating an effective buffer that would help ease tensions with its northern neighbor, to the extent that irregular migration declines and these regions manage to improve their standard of living in line with the national commitments undertaken as part of the 2030 Agenda. The PDI could therefore produce positive results in keeping with the 2030 Agenda, provided its tenets are fully implemented and expectations are not undermined by economic factors, namely the COVID-19 crisis—the full impact of which has yet to be gauged—, the viability of the current administrations’ social projects, and U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Mexico and the subregion.

¹⁰ *Idem.*

Central to the PDI is an about-turn in the conception of national security, from one of border militarization to one of human security, and the fact that this change in the development paradigm is, in essence, shared by the PND of the current government administration, seeking as it does to place people at the center of its policies, especially the most vulnerable, in keeping with the principles of social justice, the rule of law and a State of wellbeing,¹¹ would make their commonalities seem orchestrated, or even intentional, as indeed they are.

In practice, the government of President López Obrador is already implementing several programs as part of its contribution to the PDI. As regards the social component of the PND, the two most noteworthy initiatives are: *Sembrando Vida* and *Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro*. These are being implemented in Mexico and, to date, are the flagship programs of the current administration. Targeting young, vulnerable people aged between 18 and 29 who neither work nor study, to help incorporate them into the labor market, and farmers (sowers), with a view to promoting their effective participation in “comprehensive” rural development,¹² these programs are also being implemented in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. In terms of infrastructure, which is included in this comprehensive approach, the PND explicitly states:

Sectorial social programs are expected to tangibly improve living conditions in the main zones workers migrate from and regional development projects will act as “curtains”, capturing flows of migrants on their journey northwards: the Maya Train, the Trans-Isthmus Corridor and the Free Zone on the Northern Border will create jobs and decent living conditions that attract and anchor those fleeing from poverty. [...] The executive branch of the federal government will seek to involve the United States and the sister countries of Cen-

¹¹ See Mexican Presidency, “Política Social. Construir un país con bienestar”, in Mexican Presidency, “Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-2024”, *Diario Oficial de la Federación*, July 17, 2019, morning edition, pp. 22-27, available at https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5565599&fecha=12/07/2019 (date of reference: March 28, 2020).

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

tral America that are the source of growing flows of migrants in this solution.¹³

In light of the above, given the dual undertaking of the PND and the PDI to achieve social justice and check the mass exodus of rural populations to the United States, and provided the current administration is firmly committed to implementing the programs stipulated in its PND, the Mexican side could make a valuable contribution to the PDI, as long as this paves the way for the future integration of the region and the sustainable approach established therein is respected. If the PDI can manage to appeal to international development cooperation agencies or South-South cooperation initiatives,¹⁴ Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras could all benefit from ample “additional” development resources as part of this effort. However, independently of international donors, the integrity of the PDI depends primarily on financing by the United States, and provided the right approach is adopted, the “spill overs” would be primarily in the interests of the latter. Given the approach of the current U.S. administration to the migration problem, ECLAC needs to ensure its plan is not only received with satisfaction, but that it is persuasive enough to get the United States to commit to funding.¹⁵

Despite initially “voicing” its support for the PDI, the Trump administration proceeded to launch its own plan—the Growth in the Americas initiative, officially announced in December 2019—, which covers virtually all of Latin America and the Caribbean (with the exception of Cuba, Nicaragua

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁴ For example, on presenting the PDI at the 2020 Meeting of Ambassadors and Consuls at the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Alicia Bárcena affirmed that Germany, Spain and Japan (from the global north) were interested in participating in this initiative. She also confirmed Chile and Uruguay’s interest in participating in the South-South modality.

¹⁵ To be viable, i.e. comprehensive, the PDI requires financing of 25 billion USD over the next five years. The Mexican government plans to put up 3.5 billion USD (a seventh of the total) in this period. In December 2019, the Mexican government announced it would be contributing 99 million USD to the PDI in the 2020-2021 fiscal year. “Ebrard: 99 millones de dólares a Centroamérica a través de programas”, in *Regeneración*, December 26, 2019, at <https://regeneracion.mx/ebard-99-millones-de-dolares-a-centroamerica-a-traves-de-programas/> (date of reference: March 20, 2020).

and Venezuela). This public-private plan provides for several projects that seek to involve the governments and business sectors of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in the development of communications, transportation and energy infrastructure,¹⁶ while Mexico appears to be secondary to the Trump administration's initiative in its capacity as a "bridge" country.

This decision could confirm the unilateral policy of the United States, which focuses primarily on "national" security, as the most viable to address the migration issue, while renewing development cooperation with the sub-region under its own terms. Meanwhile, the donors' conference held in Mexico City in August 2019 did not raise sufficient resources from international organizations, guest countries and interested parties, like the European Union and certain South American countries,¹⁷ and the initiative to organize a second conference for late February or March 2020, presented by ECLAC Executive Secretary Alicia Bárcena at the January meeting of ambassadors and consuls, appears to have gone up in smoke. This means that, financially speaking, the PDI currently lacks concrete support (although 36 countries have said they are interested in participating) and its legitimacy hinges mainly on the efforts made by Mexico via existing programs (*Sembrando Vida* and *Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro*), using funds from the 2011 Fondo Yucatán (Infrastructure Fund for the Countries of Mesoamerica and the Caribbean) to implement initiatives within the framework of the PDI.¹⁸ In this

¹⁶ Participating are: "el Departamento de Estado y el Departamento del Tesoro, el Departamento de Comercio y el Departamento de Energía, así como la Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID), la Agencia de Comercio y Desarrollo de los Estados Unidos (USTDA) y la Corporación para la Inversión Privada en el Extranjero (OPIC)". "América Crece, el plan de Estados Unidos para reactivar la economía en América Latina que excluye a las dictaduras de Venezuela, Cuba y Nicaragua", in Infobae, December 17, 2019, at <https://www.infobae.com/america/eeuu/2019/12/18/america-crece-el-plan-de-eeuu-para-reactivar-la-economia-en-america-latina-que-excluye-a-las-dictaduras-de-venezuela-cuba-y-nicaragua/> (date of reference: July 4, 2020).

¹⁷ Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation, "Primer Encuentro de donantes y cooperantes al PDI", August 13, 2020, at <https://www.gob.mx/amexcid/articulos/primer-encuentro-de-donantes-y-cooperantes-al-pdi-212988?idiom=es> (date of reference: July 2, 2020).

¹⁸ Mathieu Tourliere, "AMLO otorga a Ebrard la gestión del "Fondo Yucatán", in *Proceso*, June 25, 2019, at <https://www.proceso.com.mx/589705/amlo-otorga-a-ebard-la-gestion-del-fondo-yucatan> (date of reference: July 4, 2020). On June 20, 2019, the Mexican government announced it would be committing 30 million USD to the *Sembrando Vida* program in El Salvador to kick-start the PDI.

regard, the actions of the Mexican government can be seen to continue a tradition of solidarity with the subregion, but they also reveal that this project ranks high among its priorities, given that it promotes the nation's current economic model. However, as we have indicated, this bias sheds light on a possible weakness: the economic aspect of the PND, whose viability depends largely on international cooperation.

Finally, it should be noted that the government has broadened the scope of the Fondo Yucatán. Even more interesting is the explicit inclusion of the migration issue. According to the decree handed down by President López Obrador, the Fondo provides funding for “programs, projects and actions in the areas of infrastructure, the development of human capital, the equipping of facilities and shelters, and the development of systems for the registration, control and follow-up of flows of migrants, in addition to assistance, training, studies and trade in related goods and services.”¹⁹ This shift takes on relevance in the context of negotiations in Washington between the Mexican government and the Trump administration, where it was made clear tariffs would be imposed on Mexico if it did not take effective action to check migration.

Challenges in the Coming Decade

In adopting the 2030 Agenda, the previous administration pushed for a development model that worked for everyone. It then follows that the current administration has a huge responsibility to adopt and align these goals with its national, state and even municipal plans and policies, so as to ensure the continuity of an Agenda that spans several government terms. Yet it has gone one step further by promoting a new development paradigm, the so-called *post-neoliberal development model*, whose tenets it must implement in keeping with the proposals of the PDI, while bearing in mind the needs of the productive engine in the interests of the Plan's economic

¹⁹ *Idem*. Compare this to the Calderón decree, which states that the purpose of the same fund is to “grant financial support to infrastructure programs and projects, including technical assistance and trade in goods and services related to infrastructure, among others, with a view to contributing to economic, social and institutional development” in the subregion. *Idem*.

component, which demands not just sustainable, but “sustained” growth. In other words, the government needs to guarantee the country’s economic growth (measured in terms of GDP), while consolidating this growth with increased public spending on infrastructure, social welfare, entrepreneurship and sustainable strategic investment in environmental projects in the mid-to-long terms.

However, the cancelation of several reforms and infrastructure projects promoted by the previous administration, compounded by generalized mistrust among investors as to the government’s real intentions, has resulted in a substantial decline in investment in the country. This uncertainty became even more patent as expectations rose among the business sector and society at large following the President’s announcement on April 3, 2020 of a contingency economic plan to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. So, naturally, it came as a surprise that, during his State of the Union Address, he revealed that “the old plan was the new plan”, in the sense that the goals of the PND have and will continue to be the current administration’s priority, regardless of the country’s new economic reality. This is what President López Obrador implied when he announced more funding for social programs targeting the most vulnerable, stating that “an economic model that only benefits minorities does not create general wellbeing, but, on the contrary, breeds widespread poverty and violence”.²⁰

Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, the country’s economic outlook was already grim. By way of example, in February 2020, during the presentation of the National Strategy for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the President’s Chief-of-Staff, Alfonso Romo, acknowledged discouraging domestic growth forecasts as the greatest obstacle to Mexico’s compliance with the SDGs. “I am worried because if there’s one area in which we haven’t seen results, it’s economic growth, and without economic growth we cannot combat poverty, achieve gender equality and everything else we are talking about here”.²¹ Recently, former finance minister Carlos Urzúa established a simi-

²⁰ Redacción AN/ECS, “Descarta AMLO medidas contracíclicas ‘neoporfiristas’ ante crisis”, in *Aristegui noticias*, April 5, 2020, at <https://aristeguinoticias.com/0504/mexico/descarta-amlo-medidas-contraciclicas-ante-tesis/> (date of reference: April 21, 2020).

²¹ Jorge Monroy, “Agenda 2030 no tendrá éxito, si no se logra el crecimiento económico: Alfonso Romo”, *El Economista*, February 26, 2020, at <https://www.economista.com.mx/politica/Agenda-2030-no-tendra-exito-si-no-se-logra-el-crecimiento-economico-alfonso-romo>.

lar conditioning factor, but when he said that the country's main problem is that there is no public money, he also pointed out that Mexico has a "tradition" of low tax collection compared to other Latin American economies,²² which makes it extremely hard to see visions and plans through, whether national or regional.

Given that the full impact of the COVID-19 global crisis has yet to make itself felt, we might question the extent to which Mexico's public policies will really attempt to correct socio-economic injustices, while continuing to try to keep the economy ticking over efficiently and productively, so as to further all aspects of sustainable development. Consequently, the level of support the PND and the PDI are able to round up in the future will depend on the government's capacity to work with the business sector to address the crisis, how well it deals with crucial environmental issues, and how skillfully it is able to wield its diplomatic clout to create synergies with the United States that further the end goal of promoting subregional development as the most viable means of checking migration in the long term.

Conclusion

For decades, ECLAC has issued recommendations to the region's governments on how to improve their economic performance, so as to guarantee the wellbeing of their societies. Rarely, if ever, have its policies been incorporated almost in their entirety into a National Development Plan. As an emerging economy, the Mexican government has the opportunity to implement an "authentically Latin-American" model aimed at one of the poorest regions of the continent, to which end and in accordance with the priorities of the region's leaders, ECLAC has drawn up a plan that promotes a new development paradigm in line with the 2030 Agenda. Precise-

da-2030-no-tendra-exito-si-no-se-logra-el-crecimiento-economico-Alfonso-Romo-20200226-0098.html (date of reference: July 4, 2020).

²² Javier Lafuente, "El principal problema que enfrenta México en términos económicos es que no hay dinero público", *El País*, July 2, 2020, at <https://elpais.com/mexico/2020-07-02/el-principal-problema-que-enfrenta-mexico-en-terminos-economicos-es-que-no-hay-dinero-publico.html> (date of reference: July 4, 2020).

ly because the PND is grounded on the rule of law, human rights and social justice, it can be inferred that the current administration's main concern is the social component of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

In working toward the shared goals of the PND and the PDI, of addressing, specifically and comprehensively, the social and economic challenges facing the subregion, the current administration would not only be delivering on one of the main pledges of its mandate, but would be able to create an effective buffer that helps ease tensions with the United States, to the extent that irregular migration declines and these regions are able to improve their living conditions in line with the national commitments undertaken as part of the 2030 Agenda. That said, the implementation of the PDI by Mexico's current administration will depend on how successfully it is able to deal with national and international circumstances, and its ability to reach an agreement that does not disregard the economic component of the 2030 Agenda. For now, it would seem the government views the notions of solidarity and equality as more worthy of upholding than the very idea of sustainability itself (all three pillars). It would appear to be an act of justice, of reconciliation with our past, "with those we left behind", reason why the social component of the 2030 Agenda and the human security approach taken by the PDI embody "the highest priority" of this administration.