La seguridad energética de la Unión Europea en el contexto del reposicionamiento geopolítico de Rusia

The crisis between Russia and the Ukraine in January 2009 resulted in the cutting off of gas natural supplies to the European Union (EU), underlining the need to seek out alternatives, given that the eu is not self-sufficient in non-renewable fuels and depends heavily on imports. A massive 80% of Russia’s gas exports to Europe pass through the Ukraine, hence the need to find new routes. Construction on the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, spearheaded by Russia, has been stepped up, but while these pipelines will guarantee an uninterrupted flow of gas via the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, they do not constitute an alternative to Russian gas. One possible option for Central and Eastern European countries is the so-called Nabucco Project, which would transport gas from member states in the basin of the Caspian Sea and, in the foreseeable future, perhaps even Iran, Iraq and Egypt. Five gas companies in Central and Southeast Europe —Botas of Turkey, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, Trabsgaz of Rumania, Mol of Hungary and omv of Austria— have agreed to study the feasibility of the pipeline, which would cross Turkey to the Austrian city of Baumgarten. However, stronger, more industrialized member states, like Germany and France, which cannot survive on fewer imports, have put their national interests over community ones. This is especially true in the case of Germany, which has offered to purchase natural gas from Russia at a higher price than Eastern European countries can afford. If this scenario plays out, it would undermine the European alternative and further Russia’s strategy to secure a dominant position on the larger European markets, there by discouraging attempts to seek out other supply options that might threaten its monopoly over smaller Central European and Central Asian markets.